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Even without ‘Senate’ electoral votes, the size of the U.S. House
of Representatives could still determine the outcome of
presidential elections.
Earlier this year on this blog, Fabrice Barthélémy, Mathieu Martin, and Ashley Piggins showed
that under the Electoral College system, the arbitrary size of the House of Representatives, not
the voters, can determine the outcome of a presidential election. They referred to work by
Nicholas R. Miller to explain this ‘House size effect.’ Here he further explores the issue and
writes that, even without ‘Senate’ electoral votes, the winner of the electoral vote could still
depend on the size of the House.
In the language of Madison’s Federalist 39, the apportionment of electoral votes in Presidential
elections is a compromise between the ‘federal’ principle of state equality embodied in the Senate and the
‘national’ principle of state representation according to population embodied in the House of Representatives. 
Given a fixed number of states, the weighting of the two principles is determined by the size of the House, which
Congress can change by simple legislation (and did so regularly until about a hundred years ago).  At present,
and counting the District of Columbia as a state for electoral vote purposes, there are 102 ‘Senate’ electoral votes
(two for each state) and 436 ‘House’ electoral votes (all others).
Typically the federal and national principles give the same verdict — that is, one candidate carries a majority of
states and therefore wins a majority of Senate electoral votes and the same candidate wins a majority of House
electoral votes.  But the two principles sometimes give conflicting verdicts.  For example, in the 2000 election
Bush carried 30 states to Gore’s 21, giving Bush a margin of 18 with respect to Senate electoral votes, while Gore
won 225 House electoral votes to 211 for Bush, giving Gore a margin of 14, so Bush won by an overall  margin of
four electoral votes.  However, if the House size had been larger, Gore’s House electoral vote margin would have
been increased in roughly the same proportion so, with a sufficiently larger House, Gore would have won an
overall electoral vote majority.
This illustrates the House size effect: the winner of the election, i.e., the candidate who wins a majority of electoral
votes, depends on the size of the House. The 2000 example suggests that a presidential election is subject to the
House size effect if and only if (1) one candidate (say A) wins a majority of the Senate electoral votes, and (2) the
other candidate (say B) wins a majority of the House electoral votes.  The logic of the House size effect is
suggested in Figure 1. (For the moment ignore the squiggly line overlying the smooth ‘Total EV% for Candidate A’
line.)
Figure 1 – Illustration of Conditions for the House Size Effect (EV= electoral votes)
Note: Candidate A wins a majority (S% > 50%) of ‘Senate’ electoral votes but the states A
carries collectively have less than half (H% < 50%) of the total population.  House size runs
from zero to very large and determines whether A wins a majority of the total electoral
vote.  The smooth line connecting S% and H% shows the percent of the total electoral vote
won by A as a function of House size under perfect apportionment.  The squiggly line
fluctuating around the smooth line reflects ‘local chaos’ in apportionment and
schematically indicates the percent of the total electoral vote won by A as a function of
House size under actual (imperfect) apportionment.
As a summary of the historical record of presidential elections since 1828, this statement holds up without
exception. Table 1 shows the five presidential elections, plus a counterfactual version of the 1860 election in
which Lincoln faces a unified opposition, that meet these conditions. 
Table 1 – Historical Presidential Elections Subject to the House Size Effect
*Percent of population in states carried
 1Kennedy is credited with carrying Alabama and winning all of its electoral votes; an
unpledged elector slate carried Mississippi (8 electoral votes)
2 Counterfactual two-candidate election: Lincoln vs. united opposition
But as a theoretical proposition, the statement above does not (quite) hold up.  This is because the apportionment
of House seats is an unavoidably quirky matter, given that relatively small whole numbers of seats cannot be
apportioned among the states in a way that is perfectly proportional to much their much larger populations.  This
implies that whether a candidate wins a majority of House electoral votes may itself depend on the size of the
House.
We can sidestep the apportionment problem by supposing that the House of Representatives is (hypothetically)
perfectly apportioned by assigning each state a quota of House seats that is perfectly proportional to its
population and as such is almost never a whole number.  (Under perfect apportionment Gore would have won
225.3 and Bush 210.7 House electoral votes in 2000.)
If the House were perfectly apportioned, a Presidential election would be subject to the House size effect if and
only if (1) one candidate (say A) carries a majority of states, and (2) the other candidate (say B) carries states that
collectively hold a majority of the total population.
Furthermore, the crossover House size at which candidate A’s margin with respect to Senate electoral votes is
precisely balanced by candidate B’s margin with respect to perfectly apportioned House electoral votes (thereby
producing an electoral vote tie) is given by A’s margin with respect to Senate electoral votes divided by the B’s
margin with respect to the percent of population of states carried. Thus in 2000 Bush won 30 states to Gore’s 21
and Gore carried states with 51.6834 percent of the apportionment population to Bush’s 48.3166 percent, so
perfect apportionment implies a crossover House size of (60 − 42) / (0.516834 − 0.483166) ≃ 534.64.
But since House seats are not, and cannot be, perfectly apportioned among the states, we must confront the
apportionment problem.  There are many different apportionment methods, four of which have actually been used
to apportion House seats, which may produce (slightly) different allocations of House seats for a given House size
and profile of state populations.
Whatever the method, candidate B’s margin with respect to House electoral votes generally increases with House
size, but this margin does not and cannot increase in a smooth fashion. Suppose that the House is a given size
and is then increased by one seat.  The additional seat will be awarded to the state with the strongest claim to it
(according to the apportionment method in use) but that state may well have been carried by A, in which event B’s
electoral vote margin decreases rather than increases.  In general, the relationship between House size and
candidate B’s House (and total) electoral vote margin is ‘locally chaotic,’ as documented by the data from 2000
shown in Figure 2 (adapted from calculations by Michael G. Neubauer and Joel Zeitlin) and schematically
suggested by the squiggly overlay around the smooth ‘Total EV%’ line in Figure 1.
Figure 2 – Actual ‘Local Chaos’ in 2000 Election
Source: Adapted from Graph 1 in Michael G. Neubauer, and Joel Zeitlin,  ‘Outcomes of
Presidential Elections and the House Size.’ PS: Political Science and Politics, 36/4 (2003):
721-725.
When we take account of the ‘locally chaotic’ effects of apportionment, the previously stated conditions remain
sufficient for the House size effect but are no longer (quite) necessary. This becomes evident if we consider how
Figure 1 would look if condition (1) were not met and S% fell just below the 50% mark; while candidate B would
win at almost all House sizes, ‘local chaos’ might give candidate A just over half of the House and total electoral
vote at some small House sizes, so there would still be a House size effect.  (In somewhat similar fashion, Table 1
shows that the Democrat, Samuel Tilden, was ‘candidate B’ in 1876, generally benefitting from a larger House
size.  But even with an actual House size considerably larger than the crossover size, Tilden lost because of ‘local
chaos.’)
Indeed, suppose the Electoral College were modified by abolishing ‘Senate’ electoral votes entirely.  Given perfect
apportionment of House electoral votes, candidate A’s percent of the electoral vote would be the constant function
EV% = H%; but, given any actual apportionment of House seats (and electoral votes) into whole numbers, ‘local
chaos’ would still produce a squiggly overlay around this horizontal line so, if H% were very close to the 50%
mark, the electoral vote winner could still vary with House size.
This fact has interesting implications in another electoral context: parliamentary elections held under list
proportional representation.  Here political parties are the counterpart of states, being apportioned seats on the
basis of their electoral support, and coalitions of parties are analogous to the ‘coalitions’ of states that support
presidential candidates.  If two complementary coalitions of parties each receive very close to 50% of the vote,
their majority vs. minority status with respect to parliamentary seats could vary with the size of parliament.  (For
examples of such inversions, see here.)
This article is based on the paper “The House Size Effect and the Referendum Paradox in U.S. Presidential
Elections”, Electoral Studies, 35 (September 2014): 265-271. An ungated version is available here.
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